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ARTICLES
THE COMB WASH CASE: THE RULE OF LAW COMES
TO THE PUBLIC RANGELANDS
Joseph M. Feller*
I. INTMODUCrION
On December 20, 1993, an administrative law judge (ALJ) in the
Department of the Interior issued a decision concerning a grazing allot-
ment on public land in southeastern Utah.' District Chief ALJ John R.
Rampton, Jr., held that, in managing the Comb Wash Allotment, the Unit-
ed States Bureau of Land Management (BLM) had violated two federal
statutes-the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),2 and the Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).' Judge Rampton pro-
hibited the BLM from authorizing grazing on a small but sensitive portion
of the allotment until the BLM complies with the law.4
On its face, the decision is hardly newsworthy. It was rendered by a
low-level administrative tribunal.5 The grazing prohibition only applies to
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University.
1. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Bureau of Land Management, No. UT-06-91-1 (U.S. Department
of the Interior, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Hearings Div.) (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter Comb
Wash 11].
The facts behind Comb Wash 11 are presented in detail in Joseph M. Feller, What is Wrong
With the BLM's Management of Livestock Grazing on the Public Lands?, 30 IDAHO L. REv. 555, 586-
95 (1994) [hereinafter Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?]. That article was written
before the case was decided. The ALJ's decision was issued while the article was being edited and is
briefly described in an Epilogue to the article. Supra at 599-600.
Comb Wash 11 was the second ALJ decision about the same grazing allotment. See Feller v.
Bureau of Land Management, No. UT-06-89-02 (U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Hearings
and Appeals, Hearings Div.) (Aug. 13, 1990) [hereinafter Comb Wash 1]. Comb Wash I is discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 42-48 and in Joseph M. Feller, Grazing Management on the Public
Lands: Opening the Process to Public Participation, 26 LAND & WATER L. REv. 571 (1991) [herein-
after Feller, Grazing Management on the Public Lands].
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994); Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 17-22.
3. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 23-25.
4. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 33-36.
5. The authority of Interior Department ALJs to review BLM grazing decisions is set forth at
43 C.F.R. §§ 4.470-4.477, 4160.4 (1995). The AL's decision is subject to further administrative re-
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about ten square miles of land;6 those ten square miles only produce
enough forage to support twenty-one cows.' The decision broke no new
legal ground; other judges have halted much larger and more important
activities on public lands because of violations of NEPA and other envi-
ronmental laws.8
Nonetheless, Judge Rampton's decision has created a stir among
western public land managers and users.9 It was front-page news in a Salt
Lake City newspaper, which described it as a "landmark legal deci-
sion."" A leading treatise on public land law described the case as one of
three "major developments in the 1990s" that are "rapidly and drastically"
changing the pattern of BLM range management." A livestock industry
attorney warned that the decision might set a precedent that "would simply
shut down grazing" on federal public lands."2
Why has such a minor case, applying such well-established law,
triggered such strong reactions?
Because the law is so rarely applied on the public range. For the last
three decades, while environmental statutes and court decisions have pro-
foundly affected other uses of the public lands, 3 livestock grazing has re-
view by the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.410, 4.476 (1995). Decisions of
the IBLA may be reviewed by the Secretary of the Interior. 43 C.F.R. § 4.5(a)(2) (1995). Decisions of
the Secretary and the IBLA are subject to review by the federal courts under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
Judge Rampton's decision in Comb Wash I has been appealed to the IBLA. See infra note
191. The IBLA has ordered that Judge Rampton's decision will be in effect pending the IBLA's reso-
lution of the appeal. National Wildlife Fed'n v. BLM, 128 I.B.L.A. 231, 237 (1994).
6. Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. 1, at 136, Comb Wash 11.
7. Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. 4, at 82-83, Comb Wash H.
8. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993) (enjoining Forest
Service timber sales in the Pacific Northwest for failure to comply with NEPA); California v. Block,
690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982) (enjoining development on sixty million National Forest roadless acres
for failure to comply with NEPA); Nez Perce Tribal Executive Comm., 120 I.B.L.A. 34 (1991) (pre-
venting mining on BLM land for failure to comply with NEPA); Michael Gold, 115 I.B.L.A. 218
(1990) (preventing oil drilling on BLM land for failure to comply with NEPA). See also, e.g., Tennes-
see Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (enjoining operation of $100 million dam for failure
to comply with the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)); Seattle Audubon Soc'y
v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991), affd, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991) (enjoining timber
sales for failure to comply with the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614
(1994)).
9. See Christopher Smith, Cows are Evicted from Utah, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Jan. 24, 1994,
at 12; Ed Marston, A Stark Victory in Utah, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Jan. 24, 1994, at 16.
10. Christopher Smith, Cattle May Lose Their Home on BLM Range, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE,
Dec. 24, 1993, at A-I, col. 5. See also Michael Riley, Courts Become Weapons for Change, CASPER
STAR-TRIBUNE, June 28, 1994, at A-I, col. I (stating that this case and two others "suggest the open-
ing of a second front in the 'war' over the federal range").
11. 3 GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, Public Natural Resources Law 19-18 to
19-18.2 (1995).
12. Smith, supra note 10, at A-2, col. 2 (quoting Glen Davies, attorney for the American Farm
Bureau Federation and the Utah Farm Bureau Federation).
13. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 8. For a comprehensive treatment of the application of
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mained a backwater. 4 Federal land managers now understand that they
may not authorize timber cutting," mining, 6 or oil drilling 7 on public
lands without complying with environmental laws. Yet these same manag-
ers routinely authorize environmentally destructive livestock grazing"
without the environmental analysis required by NEPA, 9 the assessment
and consultation required by the Endangered Species Act,0 or the certifi-
cation required by the Clean Water Act.2' Just a few years ago, the BLM
took the position that the issuance of a grazing permit is not even an "ac-
tion" requiring compliance with its own regulations.'
The BLM's failure to comply with environmental laws in its grazing
program has left the agency vulnerable to administrative appeals and law-
suits. Until recently, however, few such challenges have been forthcoming.
Two seminal cases in 1974?' and 198524 established critical ground rules
environmental laws to activities on public lands, see COGGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, passim.
14. ROBERT L. GLICKsMAN & GEORGE C. COGGINS, MODERN PUBLIC LAND LAW IN A NUT-
SHELL 220 (1995) ("[Many environmental laws and safeguards that have become common in other
areas of modem public land law are still primitive on or absent from the federal range."). See also
Riley, supra note 10, at A-8, col. 3 (quoting National Wildlife Federation attorney Tom Lustig: "Graz-
ing is the truant of environmental law. It has gotten away and never been called to task.").
15. For the application of environmental laws to timber cutting on public lands see 3 COGGiNS
& GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, § 20.02.
16. For the application of environmental laws to mining on public lands, see 3 COGGINs &
GuCKSMAN, supra note 11, § 25.04.
17. For the application of environmental laws to oil and gas development on public lands, see 3
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, § 23.02[4].
18. For summaries of the environmental impacts of livestock grazing on the western public
lands, see LYNN JACOBS, WASTE OF THE WEST. PUBLIC LANDS RANCHING (1991); Thomas L.
Fleischner, Ecological Costs of Livestock Grazing in Western North America, 8 CONSERVATION BIOL-
OGY 629 (1994); Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 560-63.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (requiring environmental impact statements (EISs) for major fed-
eral actions significantly affecting the human environment); 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11,
ch. 10G. See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 841 (D.D.C.
1974), affid per curiam, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976) (holding
that the BLM must prepare EISs for livestock grazing permits).
20. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(3) (requiring consultation with the Secretary of the Interior on any
prospective agency action that is likely to affect an endangered or threatened species); 16 U.S.C. §
1536(c) (requiring a biological assessment to determine whether an agency action is likely to affect an
endangered or threatened species); 2 COGGINS & GuCKSMAN, supra note 11, ch. 15C.
21. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1994) (requiring certification that federally-permitted activities
will not cause violations of water quality standards). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1994) (requiring
federal agencies to comply with federal, state, and local water pollution control requirements); 33
U.S.C. § 1329 (1994) (requiring nonpoint source management programs); 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN,
supra note 11, § IIA.03.
22. Feller, Grazing Management on the Public Lands, supra note 1, at 589 & n.136.
23. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 841 (D.D.C. 1974),
affid per curiam, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976) (holding that the
BLM must prepare EISs for livestock grazing permits).
24. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 866-71 (E.D. Cal.
1985) (holding that the BLM may not hand over control of grazing allotments to permittees).
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for BLM range management, but there has been very little litigation to
enforce those rules.' The Comb Wash case was the first instance in
which any reviewing tribunal, administrative or judicial, was asked to halt
livestock grazing on a piece of BLM land because the BLM had failed to
comply with environmental laws. 6
In the absence of legal pressure, BLM managers and rancher-
permittees have come to assume that livestock grazing on public lands
may continue indefinitely without environmental compliance. The Comb
Wash decision has evoked such strong reactions because it has disturbed
that expectation. Despite the expressed fears of the livestock industry, the
decision will not "shut down" public lands grazing. But it may help to
bring grazing within the normal legal framework that governs other uses
of the public lands.
Part II of this Article summarizes the Comb Wash case and Judge
Rampton's decision. Part III places the decision in perspective by discuss-
ing the systemic, West-wide BLM practices that were reflected in the
particular actions that Judge Rampton found unlawful on the Comb Wash
Allotment. Part IV discusses Judge Rampton's application of the principle
of "multiple use," a concept previously dismissed as contentless by some
legal commentators. Finally, the Conclusion briefly speculates on the
likely effect (or lack thereof) of the decision on BLM range management
outside of the Comb Wash Allotment.
25. But see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp 1045, 1062-63 (1).
Nev. 1985), affd, 819 F.2d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1987) (unsuccessful challenge to BLM land use plan for
failure to comply with NEPA and FLPMA).
26. Subsequent to the filing of the Comb Wash appeal, two lawsuits were filed over the failure
of the United States Forest Service to comply with NEPA in its management of grazing on two Na-
tional Forests. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Kulesza, No. CV 94-23-BU (D. Mont., filed March 30,
1994) (Beaverhead National Forest); California Trout v. United States Forest Service, Civil No. C 94
0563 BAC (N.D. Cal., filed Feb. 16, 1994) (Sierra National Forest). Although the complaints in both
suits requested a halt to grazing in some areas pending NEPA compliance, both suits resulted in settle-
ments that did not require any cessation of grazing. See Settlement Agreement, National Wildlife
Fed'n (April 28, 1995); Stipulation of Dismissal, California Trout (filed Nov. 4, 1994). Two other
subsequently-filed lawsuits over endangered salmon on National Forests in Oregon and Idaho resulted
in orders that had the potential to halt grazing in some areas pending compliance with the Endangered
Species Act. See Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) (Wallowa-Whitman
and Umatilla National Forests, Oregon); Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 873 F. Supp. 365 (1).
Idaho 1995) (Boise, Challis, Nez Perce, Payette, Salmon, and Sawtooth National Forests, Idaho). More
recently, a lawsuit has been filed alleging that the BLM has failed to comply with the Endangered
Species Act in its administration of livestock grazing in the Safford District in southeast Arizona. See
Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. BLM, No. CV96-1 1 TUC RTT (filed Jan. 3, 1996). The
complaint requests a cessation of grazing in the district pending compliance with the Act.
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II. THE COMB WASH CASE
A. Background
The Comb Wash grazing allotment27 is on federal public land man-
aged by the BLM in southeastern Utah, near Natural Bridges National
Monument." Within the allotment are five deep, narrow, and spectacular
red-rock canyons30 that contain perennial streams, riparian wildlife habi-
tat, and thousands of archaeological sites." The canyons have a national
reputation for their scenic beauty and they attract thousands of visitors
annually from around the country.32
Because of their narrowness, the canyons contain very little livestock
forage. Valued at prevailing market rates, the value of the livestock forage
produced in the five canyons combined is only about $2,500.00 a year.3
Ninety percent of the allotment's forage is in other pastures, outside of the
canyons.34
In order to extract this small quantity of forage, the BLM has autho-
rized the livestock permittee to periodically drive herds of cattle into the
canyons. Cattle grazing has wrought havoc on the canyon floors, seriously
degrading the vegetation, riparian areas, wildlife habitat, scenic beauty,
and recreational opportunities there. Conditions in the canyons have
been so bad that a local recreational outfitter had to discontinue trips to
two of them, and a representative of the AAA warned visitors to avoid
them.36
The Comb Wash Allotment is one of approximately seventy grazing
allotments in the BLM's San Juan Resource Area, which comprises ap-
proximately 1.8 million acres of public land in southeastern Utah.37 In
1991, the BLM adopted a land use plan,3" called a Resource Management
27. For more detailed information on the Comb Wash Allotment and the facts behind the Comb
Wash case, see Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 586-95.
28. For a brief description of the nature and extent of the lands and resources managed by the
BLM, see Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 558-59.
29. A map showing the location of the allotment can be found in Smith, supra note 10.
30. The canyons are Arch Canyon, Mule Canyon, Fish Creek Canyon, Owl Creek Canyon, and
Road Canyon. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 4; Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Manage-
ment?, supra note 1, at 587 & n.166.
31. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 11, 15; Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Manage-
ment?, supra note 1, at 587-88.
32. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 587-88.
33. Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. 9, at 116-18, Comb Wash II; Feller, What is Wrong With
the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 589.
34. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 589.
35. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 11-16; Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Manage-
ment?, supra note 1, at 589-91.
36. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 591.
37. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 592.
38. BLM land use plans are prescribed by section 202 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1712. For dis-
1996]
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Plan (RMP), for the San Juan Resource Area.39 The RMP was accompa-
nied by an environmental impact statement (EIS),' and the combination
is known as the San Juan RMP/EIS. The RMP/EIS is a broad, general
planning document that does not contain detailed information about, or
management prescriptions for, individual grazing allotments within the
Resource Area. In particular, the RMP/EIS does not identify or discuss the
scenic, recreational, archaeological, or wildlife resources in the Comb
Wash canyons, and it does not reveal the nature and extent of the impacts
of grazing on those resources.41
B. Comb Wash I
In 1989, the BLM issued a ten-year grazing permit for the Comb
Wash Allotment when the previous permit expired. The author appealed
the issuance of the permit to an administrative law judge (ALJ),42 alleg-
ing that the BLM had failed to consult with affected parties as required by
its regulations.43 The appeal also alleged violations of NEPA, FLPMA,
and the Clean Water Act.
In Comb Wash I,' ALJ Rampton held that the issuance of a grazing
permit is an "action" within the meaning of the BLM's regulations, requir-
ing notice to affected parties, a statement of reasons, and opportunity for
protest.45 Judge Rampton set aside the ten-year permit and remanded the
matter to the BLM. 6 Because of the lack of an adequate factual record,
Judge Rampton did not reach the NEPA, FLPMA, and Clean Water Act
issues.47 However, he instructed the BLM:
On remand, BLM should take care to set out in an articulate and rea-
cussions of BLM land use planning, see 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, § IOF.04; Feller,
What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 565, 571-73; Feller, Grazing Manage-
ment on the Public Lands, supra note 1, at 576-78.
39. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PROPOSED RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE SAN JUAN RESOURCE AREA (1989). This proposed RMP became final
when it was formally adopted in 1991. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERI-
OR, SAN JUAN RESOURCE AREA RECORD OF DECISION AND RANGELAND PROGRAM SUMMARY (1991).
40. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, SAN JUAN RESOURCE
AREA PROPOSED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1987).
41. Comb Wash H, supra note 1, at 8-10, 21; Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Manage-
ment?, supra note 1, at 592.
42. See supra note 5.
43. See 43 C.F.R. § 4160.1-1 (1994) (requiring the BLM to send notice of proposed grazing
decisions to "affected interests"); 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1994) (defining "affected interest"); 43 C.F.R.
§ 4160.2 (1994) (requiring opportunity for affected interests to protest proposed decisions); Feller,
Grazing Management on the Public Lands, supra note 1, at 580-82, 587.
44. Comb Wash 1, supra note 1.
45. Comb Wash I, supra note 1, at 4.
46. Comb Wash 1, supra note 1, at 6.
47. Comb Wash 1, supra note 1, at 2, 6.
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soned manner the basis for any decision regarding grazing in the Comb
Wash allotment and, among other things, the decision should set forth
the basis for asserting compliance with, or exemption from, the appli-
cable provisions of law and regulation and should demonstrate consider-
ation of any applicable monitoring studies.0
C. Comb Wash I: The Appeal
On March 6, 1991, the BLM issued a Notice of Final Decision in
response to Judge Rampton's remand.49 In the Notice, the BLM claimed
that the San Juan RMP/EIS satisfied the BLM's obligations under NEPA
and FLPMA. °
The BLM also announced its intention to develop an allotment man-
agement plan (AMP)5' for the Comb Wash Allotment through a Coordi-
nated Resource Management (CRM)52 process. 3 In the interim, while
the AMP was under development, the BLM would authorize continued
grazing on the allotment by annual permits. 4 A new ten-year permit
would be issued at the completion of the CRM process.5
The National Wildlife Federation, the Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance, and the author (collectively NWF) appealed the Notice of Final
Decision.56 The permittee, the Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribe, intervened
in the appeal.57 Two groups of livestock industry and agricultural associa-
tions also intervened."
Subsequently, NWF also appealed two annual grazing authorizations
issued pursuant to the Notice of Final Decision in September, 1991 and
September, 1992."' The three appeals, which were consolidated by Judge
Rampton," alleged that the BLM had violated the law in five ways:
48. Comb Wash I, supra note 1, at 6.
49. Moab District, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, Notice of Final Decision (March 6,
1991) [hereinafter Final Decision].
50. Final Decision, supra note 49, at 3.
51. See 43 U.S.C. § 1752(d); 43 C.F.R. § 4120.2 (1995).
52. CRM is a planning process adopted by the BLM and other agencies in Utah to address
some site-specific land use problems. See Feller, Grazing Management on the Public Lands, supra
note 1, at 595 n.180.
53. Final Decision, supra note 49, at 3-4.
54. Final Decision, supra note 49, at 4.
55. Final Decision, supra note 49, at 4.
56. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 3.
57. Order at 2, Comb Wash II (July 25, 1991) (granting motion to intervene).
58. Id. at 1 (granting motions to intervene by (1) the Public Lands Council, the National
Cattlemen's Association, and the American Sheep Industry Association, and (2) the American Farm
Bureau Federation and the Utah Farm Bureau Federation).
59. Comb Wash 11, supra note 1, at 3.
60. Comb Wash 11, supra note 1, at 3.
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1. NEPA: NWF alleged that the BLM had violated NEPA by autho-
rizing grazing on the Comb Wash Allotment without preparing and con-
sidering an EIS6' that evaluates the specific environmental consequences
of the grazing.62
2. FLPMA: NWF alleged that the BLM had violated FLPMA's prin-
ciple of "multiple use" 3 by authorizing grazing in the five canyons on
the allotment without making a reasoned and informed decision as to
whether grazing in the canyons is in the public interest.'
3. Stocking rate: NWF alleged that the BLM had violated FLPMA by
considering only forage utilization and trend data" and ignoring such
other factors as water quality, wildlife habitat, soil erosion, and natural
scenery in setting the stocking rate for the allotment.'
4. Public participation: NWF alleged that the BLM had violated its
regulations67 and Judge Rampton's order in Comb Wash I 8 by issuing
annual grazing permits for the Comb Wash Allotment without consulting
with affected parties.69
5. Forage utilization limits: NWF alleged that the forage utilization
limits that the BLM had set for the Comb Wash Allotment were excessive
and contrary to the San Juan RMP."
As a remedy for the violations of NEPA and FLPMA, NWF request-
ed that grazing be prohibited in the five canyons on the allotment until the
BLM complies with the law.7'
D. Comb Wash 11: The Motion to Dismiss
The BLM moved to dismiss the appeal,72 arguing, among other
things, that the appeal was premature because the BLM had not yet com-
61. See supra note 19.
62. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 4.
63. See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (requiring management of the public lands "under principles of
multiple use and sustained yield"); 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (defining "multiple use" as the combination of
uses "that will best meet the present and future needs of the American people," including "the use of
some land for less than all of the resources," and with "consideration being given to the relative values
of the resources"). See also Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at
566-67 (discussing BLM authority to discontinue grazing in selected areas).
64. Comb Wash 1!, supra note 1, at 4.
65. See Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 576-81 (describ-
ing BLM policy to rely exclusively on utilization and trend data to set stocking rates).
66. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 4.
67. See supra note 43.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
69. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 4.
70. Comb Wash 1i, supra note 1, at 4; see 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-8 (1995) (requiring livestock
grazing to be in conformance with land use plans).
71. Comb Wash H, supra note I, at 30.
72. Motion to Dismiss, Comb Wash 1! (May 24, 1991).
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pleted the CRM planning process73 for the allotment. Judge Rampton
rejected the BLM's motion. He agreed with NWF that the decision to con-
tinue grazing on the allotment pending completion of the CRM process
was final and appealable:
In his final decision, the District Manager issued a 1-year permit allow-
ing grazing to continue at current levels, subject to modifications based
on changing conditions. Issuance of a 10-year permit was denied until a
Coordinated Resource Management Plan (CRMP) was completed. Re-
spondent and intervenors contend that this appeal is not ripe since the
new 10-year permit has not been granted and the study on which it will
be based has not been completed.
This appeal is from a final decision issued by the District Manager
whose decision did more than initiate a study. Grazing privileges were
granted through annual permits. These grazing privileges are present
interests, and challenges to the issuance of such permits are ripe.74
The CRMP process will not provide an adequate forum for review. The
CRMP will make recommendations for future allotments [sic], but it will
not prevent the damage that appellants allege is occurring before the
study is complete. The CRIvP process may take several years and will
likely not be completed before the next grazing season.75
E. Comb Wash II: The Decision
In 1992 and 1993, Judge Rampton held eighteen days of hearings on
the appeal.76 Approximately twenty-five witnesses testified at the hear-
ings, including scientific experts, BLM staff, a representative of the per-
mittee, and recreational users of the canyons.'
On December 20, 1993, Judge Rampton issued his decision on the
consolidated appeals. He concluded that NWF had "presented overwhelm-
ing evidence that grazing has significantly degraded and may continue to
degrade the quality of the human environment" in the Comb Wash can-
yons.78 Judge Rampton held in favor of NWF on each of the issues raised
in the appeal. The following is a summary of Judge Rampton's holdings.
73. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
74. Order at 2, Comb Wash I1 (July 25, 1991).
75. Id. at 5.
76. Comb Wash 11, supra note 1, at 3.
77. For a list of the witnesses presented by NWF, see Answer to the Statements of Reasons
Filed by the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Utah Farm Bureau Federation, and Bureau of Land Management
at 20-21, National Wildlife Fed'n v. BLM, No. IBLA 94-264 (Interior Board of Land Appeals) (July
26, 1994).
78. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 4.
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1. NEPA
Judge Rampton found that the "BLM has simply failed to perform
any site-specific assessment" of the environmental impacts of grazing on
the Comb Wash Allotment. 79 He found that the San Juan RMP/EIS s" "is
simply devoid of any site-specific information or analysis regarding the
impacts of grazing on the resource values of the particular allotment in
question""1 and that the "BLM has never completed the next step of con-
ducting a site-specific NEPA analysis."82
Judge Rampton rejected arguments by the BLM and the interve-
nors 3 that the BLM was in the midst of a "tiered ' 84 process that would
eventually result in NEPA compliance:
BLM and/or intervenors argue that even if BLM was required to prepare,
but has not yet prepared, an adequate EIS, BLM is in compliance with
NEPA because it has prepared a general programmatic EIS [the San Juan
RMP/EIS] and intends at some undetermined date in the future to "tier"
to that EIS an environmental analysis of the site-specific impacts of its
grazing authorizations. This argument is plainly contrary to the aforemen-
tioned [NEPA case] law, which requires an adequate EIS to be prepared
prior to implementation of the proposed actions. 5
2. FLPMA
Judge Rampton held that the BLM had violated FLPMA by failing to
make a "reasoned and informed decision" as to whether grazing in the
canyons is consistent with FLPMA's definition of "multiple use. ' 86 He
found that the BLM had never rationally addressed the issue of whether
grazing should be permitted in the canyons. The decision to allow grazing
in the canyons had been made as the result of a BLM staff member's
mistaken belief that the issue had already been decided in the San Juan
79. Comb Wash I, supra note 1, at 21.
80. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
81. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 9.
82. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 22.
83. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
84. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1995) (defining "tiering" as:
coverage of general matters in broader environmental impact statements (such as national
program or policy statements) with subsequent narrower statements or environmental analy-
ses (such as regional or basin-wide program statements or ultimately site-specific state-
ments) incorporating by reference the general discussions and concentrating solely on the
issues specific to the statement subsequently prepared).
See also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (1995) (discussing the use of "tiering").
85. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 22.
86. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 23-25; see supra note 63.
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RMP/EIS.Y "BLM's decision to graze the canyons was not reasoned or
informed, but rather, based upon [the staff member's] misinterpretation of
the RMP and a totally inadequate investigation and analysis of the condi-
tion of the canyons' varied resources and the impacts of grazing upon
those resources.""8
3. Stocking Rate
Judge Rampton found that "BLM has ignored most multiple-use
values other than grazing not only when authorizing grazing in the can-
yons, but also when setting the stocking rates for the Comb Wash Allot-
ment, both in the canyons and elsewhere .... BLM's failure to adequate-
ly consider many factors other than range utilization and trend data when
setting stocking rates violates FLPMA's mandate to protect the full spec-
trum of environmental, ecological, cultural, and recreational values." 9
4. Public Participation
Judge Rampton chastised the BLM for refusing to consult with affect-
ed parties about the terms of the annual grazing permits that it was issuing
for the Comb Wash Allotment. "BLM has violated several of its own
regulations by excluding affected interests from participation in the man-
agement of the Comb Wash Allotment." ° He characterized the BLM's
closed-door policy as "open defiance" of his previous order in Comb Wash
L Judge Rampton ordered the BLM to provide affected parties advance
notice, a statement of reasons, and opportunity for protest before issuing
any future grazing authorization for the Comb Wash Allotment, "regard-
less of the form of the authorization."'
5. Forage Utilization Limits
Judge Rampton found that the forage utilization limits that the BLM
had set for the Comb Wash Allotment were contrary to law because they
were "far in excess of the limit specified in the applicable land use
plan. 93
87. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 23-24.
88. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 25.
89. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 25 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(8), 1702(c)).
90. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 27-28 (citing 43 C.F.R. §§ 4160.1-1, 4110.3-3(a), 4130.6-
3).
91. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 27; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
92. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 35.
93. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 28 (citing 43 C.F.R. §§ 4100.0-8, 1601.0-5(b)).
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6. Remedy
As a remedy for the violations of NEPA and FLPMA, Judge
Rampton prohibited the BLM from authorizing grazing in the five Comb
Wash canyons unless and until the BLM prepares an adequate EIS and
makes a reasoned and informed decision of whether grazing in the can-
yons is consistent with FLPMA's multiple-use mandate.94
III. THE COMB WASH CASE IN PERSPECTIVE
A. Grazing Without Laws
Although public attention focused on Judge Rampton's final decision
of December 20, 1993, Judge Rampton's rejection of the BLM's motion to
dismiss two years earlier9" was equally significant. In rejecting that mo-
tion, Judge Rampton undermined an unstated but critical assumption that
has guided BLM range management throughout the modem era of envi-
ronmental legislation.
Although the BLM has never explicitly asserted that grazing on the
lands it manages is exempt from environmental laws, it has always acted
on the implicit assumption that grazing may continue indefinitely without
compliance with such laws. The BLM has never recognized an obligation
on its part to ensure compliance with environmental laws at the time it
authorizes grazing through issuance of a permit or lease,96 or at any other
particular time. Rather, the BLM has continued to issue grazing permits
and leases without regard to environmental laws, while treating environ-
mental compliance as a goal to be attained at such an indefinite future
time as funding, personnel, and conflicting priorities allow.
Acting under this implicit assumption, the BLM has frequently at-
tempted to address conflicts over the environmental impacts of grazing by
initiating lengthy, open-ended processes in which it convenes various
interested parties to attempt to reach a consensus. Regardless of whether
consensus is ever reached, such processes provide a convenient delaying
mechanism to defer difficult decisions. Invariably, grazing continues un-
abated during the indefinite pendency of the process.
The BLM's invocation of such a process in the Comb Wash case was
entirely typical. Faced with the prospect of being held accountable for the
environmental impacts of grazing on a particular place, the BLM con-
vened the "CRM planning group" as an avoidance mechanism, while
continuing to authorize grazing through annual permits. The BLM then
94. Comb Wash I, supra note I, at 34, 36.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
96. See Feller, Grazing Management on the Public Lands, supra note 1, at 582-86.
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argued to Judge Rampton that any adjudication of the appellants' claims
would be premature while the CRM process was ongoing.'
Judge Rampton cut straight through the BLM's tactic. In rejecting the
motion to dismiss, he held that the annual permits themselves were ap-
pealable BLM actions with potentially significant environmental conse-
quences.98 Regardless of the eventual outcome of the CRM process, the
BLM could not authorize continued grazing on the Comb Wash Allotment
without being held accountable for compliance with environmental laws.
The decision on the merits of Comb Wash II complemented and
reinforced the disposition of the motion to dismiss. In ruling on the fourth
issue raised by the appellants,99 Judge Rampton held that the BLM's issu-
ances of annual grazing permits for the Comb Wash Allotment were "ac-
tions" within the meaning of the BLM's regulations"° requiring notice to
affected interests, a statement of reasons for the action, and opportunity
for protest.''
Judge Rampton's decision does not preclude the use of CRM or other
group processes to assist the BLM in making decisions on controversial
land management issues. But it does undercut the BLM's ability to use
such processes to avoid accountability. Once the BLM, livestock
permittees, and other participating parties understand that failure to resolve
environmental issues will have real and immediate consequences, they will
have a strong incentive to make such processes actually work, rather than
just to consume time and divert energy.
B. Grazing Without NEPA
The Comb Wash case may mark the beginning of the end of a twen-
ty-five-year cycle by which the BLM has avoided compliance with NEPA
in its management of the public rangelands. NEPA, passed in 1969, re-
quires each federal agency to prepare and consider an EIS for every "ma-
jor Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment."' "ra The EIS must include a "detailed" description of the envi-
ronmental impacts of the proposed action and of alternatives to the action.
97. See Motion to Dismiss at 4, Comb Wash 11 (May 24, 1991).
98. See supra text accompanying note 74.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
100. See supra note 43.
101. See supra text accompanying note 92. For discussions of the importance of public participa-
tion in annual BLM grazing management decisions, see Feller, Grazing Management on the Public
Lands, supra note 1, at 575-76, 584-85, 592-93; Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?,
supra note 1, at 574-75, 594-95.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). For a discussion of the application of NEPA to federal public
lands management, see 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, ch. 10G.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
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1. NRDC v. Morton
Since the passage of NEPA, the BLM has sought ways to maintain
the status quo of livestock grazing on virtually all the lands that it manag-
es 104 without being held accountable for the detailed analysis of the
grazing's impacts required by NEPA. The BLM's first approach was to
nominally comply with NEPA by preparing a single, nationwide grazing
EIS to "provide an overview of the cumulative impact" of livestock graz-
ing on all BLM lands." 5 The nationwide EIS contained no specific infor-
mation about the impacts of grazing in any particular area. °6 While the
BLM stated that it might subsequently prepare more site-specific EISs for
some areas," 7 the BLM apparently intended that those EISs would be
triggered only when the BLM took new "actions,"'0 8 such as promulga-
tion of allotment management plans (AMPs)," to alter the status quo.
The BLM apparently believed that, so long as it didn't change anything, it
could lawfully perpetuate continued grazing on all of its lands with no
more NEPA documentation than the national EIS.
This approach was defeated in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Morton,"' in which the court held that the BLM's continuing
issuance and renewal of grazing permits constitutes a "major federal ac-
tion[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" within
the meaning of NEPA,"' regardless of whether the permits merely per-
petuate existing grazing practices. The court also concluded that the na-
tional programmatic EIS that the BLM was preparing was grossly inade-
quate to fulfill NEPA's requirements." 2
In determining that NEPA required more than a general, programmat-
ic EIS, the court emphasized the need for site-specific information that
would assist local BLM officials in setting the terms and conditions of
individual grazing permits:
In the BLM grazing license program the primary decision-maker is gen-
erally the individual district manager, with his staff, who approves li-
cense applications. While the programmatic EIS drafted by the BLM
104. See Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 570.
105. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 832 (D.D.C. 1974),
affd per curiam, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976).
106. Morton, 388 F. Supp. at 838-39.
107. Id. at 832-33.
108. Id. at 833, 840.
109. Id. at 832, 833 n.3; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1752(d).
110. 388 F. Supp. 829, 832 (D.D.C. 1974), affd per curiam, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976).
111. Id. at 833-34.
112. Id. at 836-41.
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provides general policy guidelines as to relevant environmental factors, it
in no way insures that the decision-maker considers all of the specific
and particular consequences of his actions, or the alternatives available to
him. The proposed EIS does not provide the detailed analysis of local
geographic conditions necessary for the decision-maker to determine
what course of action is appropriate under the circumstances)' 3
The court required the BLM to prepare and consider environmental impact
statements "which discuss in detail the environmental effects of the pro-
posed livestock grazing, and alternatives thereto, in specific areas of the
public lands which are or will be licensed for such use.'
The court did not require a separate EIS for each permit. Rather, it
left the BLM discretion to determine the geographic scale of the EISs, so
long as they contained within them the requisite detail about the impacts
of the permits:
[P]laintiffs have not sought an impact statement for each permit. The
crucial point is that the specific environmental effects of the permits
issued, and to be issued, in each district be assessed. It will be initially
within the BLM's discretion to determine whether to make this specific
assessment in a separate impact statement for each district, or several
impact statements for each district, or one impact statement for several
districts or portions thereof, or indeed by other means. So long as the
actual environmental effects of particular [grazing] permits or groups of
permits in specific areas are assessed, questions of format are to be left
to [the BLM]." 5
2. The Aftermath of Morton
Pursuant to the decree in Morton, the BLM established a multi-year
schedule for preparation of approximately 150 grazing EISs."6 A typical
EIS was to cover an area of roughly one million acres of BLM land en-
compassing on the order of one hundred grazing allotments.
Observers and critics of the BLM held high hopes for the salutary
effect of the EISs required by Morton."7 The leading casebook on public
lands law declared that Morton "promised to reverse traditional grazing
management."'1
8
113. Id. at 838-39.
114. Id. at 841.
115. Id.
116. GEORGE C. COGGINS, Er AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND REsOURCES LAW 717 (3d ed.
1993).
117. 3 CoGGiNs & GucKsMAN, supra note 11, § 19.05[1].
118. GEORGE C. COGGINS & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PuBLic LAND AND RESOURCES
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The first EISs prepared pursuant to Morton resulted in sufficient
prescriptions for change to keep these hopes alive. Some of the early EISs
called for substantial reductions in authorized grazing levels on overgrazed
allotments."9 At least one EIS even prescribed removal of livestock from
some areas where grazing was having unacceptable impacts on valuable
ecological and recreational resources.'
Two post-Morton events, however, radically altered the nature of the
EISs that were being prepared pursuant to Morton. The first event was the
passage of FLPMA in 1976. The second event was the election of Ronald
Reagan, a self-proclaimed "sagebrush rebel," as President in 1980 and his
appointment of James Watt, a long-time advocate of ranching interests and
foe of environmentalists, as Secretary of the Interior.
FLPMA instructed the BLM to develop comprehensive land use plans
for all of its lands.'' These land use plans were to guide the manage-
ment of all activities on BLM land, including, but not limited to, graz-
ing.' The land use plans mandated by FLPMA made a natural match to
the EISs required by Morton.
The BLM wedded the two processes. In those areas for which grazing
EISs had not yet been prepared, the BLM integrated Morton's require-
ments into its land use planning." Each land use plan was accompanied
by an EIS. These EISs purported to fulfill Morton's mandate with respect
to grazing as well as satisfying NEPA's requirements for environmental
analysis of other aspects of the plans. 4
This unification of Morton's NEPA process and FLPMA's land use
planning was, in itself, logical and unobjectionable. But it created a danger
that Morton's mandate for specificity in the EISs-that the "actual envi-
ronmental effects of particular [grazing] permits or groups of permits in
specific areas" be "discuss[ed] in detail"'2 -might be lost in the gener-
LAw 711 (2d ed. 1987).
119. See COGGINS, ET AL., supra note 116, at 719-21.
120. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT: PROPOSED DOMESTIC LIVESTOCK GRAZING PROGRAM FOR THE COWHEAD-MAS-
SACRE PLANNING UNIT 1-12 (1980).
121. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712.
122. For a discussion of BLM land use planning under FLPMA, see George C. Coggins, The
Law of Public Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL.
L. 1, 86-109 (1983).
123. Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. 8, at 10, 12, 21, Comb Wash H. The witness describing the
integration of Morton's requirements into the BLM's land use planning process also stated, erroneous-
ly, that related changes in the BLM's range management policy were mandated by a court order. Id. at
10.
124. Id. at 21; see, e.g., BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, SAN
JUAN RESOURCE AREA DRAFT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
1-1 (1986).
125. Morton, 388 F. Supp. at 841 (emphasis added).
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ality of the land use planning process.
This danger was manifested in the 1980s under the Reagan/Watt
administration, which effectively neutered FLPMA's land use planning
process. Most BLM land use plans developed under the Reagan adminis-
tration and the subsequent Bush administration contained few or no specif-
ic prescriptions for livestock grazing management."l Relying on an al-
leged lack of adequate data, the BLM also eschewed any near-term reduc-
tions in livestock numbers, even on allotments that were overstocked ac-
cording to the best available information. 27 Instead, the Reagan/Watt era
land use plans simply classified allotments into broad categories according
to their overall condition and general need for improvement, and called for
collection of additional data about range conditions and forage utiliza-
tion." Under the Reagan/Watt land use plans, no reductions in grazing
levels were made unless they were proven necessary by such data.29 The
land use plan for the BLM's San Juan Resource Area in Utah, which was
at issue in the Comb Wash case, was typical of the genre. 3'
The EISs accompanying these vacuous land use plans were, for the
most part, equally devoid of specifics. In the EISs, the BLM did not at-
tempt to assess the condition of, or the impacts of grazing on, vegetation,
water quality, wildlife habitat, riparian areas, or recreational or archaeolog-
ical resources in any particular place or on any particular grazing allot-
ment.' The EISs did not evaluate the carrying capacity of allotments to
determine which were overstocked, 3 2 or consider specific alternative
measures to address conflicts between grazing and other resources and
land uses.' In short, the EISs accompanying the Reagan-era land use
plans did not contain the type of information needed to make informed
decisions about actual grazing practices in specific places. In content, if
not in form, they resembled the nationwide grazing EISs that the Morton
court had found insufficient to satisfy the requirements of NEPA.
126. Feller, Grazing Management on the Public Lands, supra note 1, at 578 & nn.51-52; Feller,
What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 572-73.
127. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 576-78.
128. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp 1045, 1050-51 (D. Nev.
1985), affld, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987); Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?,
supra note 1, at 572-73.
129. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 576-77.
130. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 592-93.
131. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 572-73; Feller,
Grazing Management on the Public Lands, supra note 1, at 579.
132. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1051-52, 1055, 1057-58.
133. Id. at 1051.
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3. NRDC v. Hodel
Seeking to vindicate the principle it had established in Morton, the
Natural Resources Defense Council returned to court in 1984 to challenge
a typical Reagan-era BLM land use plan and its accompanying EIS. The
challenge failed. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel,34
the United States District Court for the District of Nevada held that
FLPMA does not require BLM land use plans to contain specific manage-
ment prescriptions for individual grazing allotments. According to the
court, such a plan would be an "administrative straight-jacket" that was
not envisioned by Congress.'35
Once the court decided not to require the BLM to make specific
management decisions in its land use plans, it concluded in turn that the
EISs accompanying the land use plans need not contain the type of infor-
mation necessary to assist in making such decisions. "[B]ecause the scope
of the EIS is determined by the scope of the proposed action, it is unrea-
sonable to expect the EIS to analyze possible actions in greater detail than
is possible given the tentative nature of the [land use plan] itself."'36 The
court rejected all of the plaintiff's specific allegations of inadequacies in
the land use plan and the EIS,'37 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a
cursory opinion.'38
On its face, the Hodel decision seemed to represent a successful end-
run by the administration around the requirements of Morton. By shifting
the NEPA focus from "particular [grazing] permits or groups of per-
mits""' to land use plans, and then convincing the court that land use
plans do not require site-specific environmental analysis, the administra-
tion seemingly avoided Morton's requirement to evaluate and disclose "in
detail the environmental effects" of livestock grazing "in specific areas of
the public lands."'"
4. The Comb Wash Case
The Comb Wash case was built on the theory that Hodel only de-
ferred, and did not reduce or eliminate, the BLM's responsibility under
NEPA and Morton to evaluate, disclose, and consider the specific impacts
of the grazing that the BLM authorizes. Regardless of Hodel's conclusions
134. 624 F. Supp 1045 (D. Nev. 1985), aff d, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987).
135. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1060.
136. Id. at 1051.
137. Id., passim.
138. 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987); 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, § 19.05[21.
139. Morton, 388 F. Supp. at 841.
140. Id.
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about the limited role of the BLM's land use planning process, the undis-
putable fact remains that the issuance of a grazing permit is a "federal
action" within the meaning of NEPA, and that such permits, collectively if
not individually, may have very significant environmental impacts. The
theory of the Comb Wash case was that, if the BLM chooses not to ad-
dress these impacts in its land use plans or their accompanying EISs, then
it must address them in other, more site-specific NEPA documents. These
documents could be either EISs for individual allotments or groups of
allotments, or environmental assessments'4 ' that demonstrate that the im-
pacts of grazing on particular allotments or groups of allotments are insig-
nificant.
By focusing on a single allotment with nationally significant resourc-
es that were being severely degraded by the impacts of grazing,'42 the
Comb Wash case highlighted the abject failure of the BLM to evaluate,
consider, or address those impacts anywhere in its management process.
When confronted with evidence of serious environmental impacts that
were not even mentioned, let alone addressed, in the applicable land use
plan or its accompanying EIS, the BLM lapsed into confusion and contra-
diction. The BLM had insisted in its Notice of Final Decision that the San
Juan RMP/EIS fully satisfied the agency's NEPA obligations with respect
to grazing on the Comb Wash Allotment.' 43 Similarly, at the hearing in
front of Judge Rampton, the BLM's NEPA expert testified that the San
Juan RMP/EIS contained sufficient information to support reasoned and
informed decisions about grazing on the allotment.'" But when pushed
to identify where in the document site-specific information on the myriad
impacts that had been the subject of many days of testimony at the hear-
ing could be found, the BLM was unable to do so.'45 Instead, the BLM
argued, in contradiction to its Notice of Final Decision, that the RMP/EIS
was just the first step in a "tiered"'" NEPA process that would include a
141. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1995); 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, § 1OG.0211].
142. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 586-91.
143. Final Decision, supra note 49, at 1 ("[The levels of grazing on the Comb Wash Allotment
were analyzed in the Final San Juan Grazing Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) dated September
1987. The EIS analyzed a range of alternatives which covered the impacts related to ... grazing ....
The proposed decision stated livestock grazing, as analyzed in the EIS, is in compliance with appropri-
ate laws, policy, and regulations."); Final Decision, supra note 49, at 3 ("A Draft EIS and RMP was
issued in May of 1986 which specifically addressed livestock grazing on the Comb Wash Allot-
ment .... An evaluation of the environmental and economic costs were [sic] presented in the Draft
RMP and EIS.").
144. Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. 8, at 42-44, Comb Wash II (testimony of Daryl Trotter). Mr.
Trotter was the coordinator responsible for overseeing the NEPA process in the BLM's Moab District,
which covers all of southeastern Utah. Id. at 6.
145. See id. at 44-59.
146. See supra note 84.
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subsequent, site-specific analysis of grazing on the allotment. 7 The
BLM, however, was unable to offer any finite time frame for completion
of that process. "
The BLM's shifting stance reflected the agency's pattern of avoid-
ance of the requirements of NEPA and Morton. This avoidance has taken
the form of a shell game, in which the BLM always claims that those
requirements have been satisfied, or will be satisfied, in some process
other than the one that is currently under scrutiny. "9 In Hodel, the BLM
argued that its land use planning process was not the appropriate place for
detailed, site-specific consideration of the environmental impacts of graz-
ing. 5° This argument succeeded in winning judicial approval of virtually
contentless land use plans and accompanying EISs.'' But when affected
parties subsequently demand that the BLM follow up the land use plans
with more detailed, site-specific analyses, the BLM argues that those same
land use plans and their accompanying EISs have satisfied the BLM's
obligations under NEPA and that no further analysis is required. This
claim, however, becomes untenable when a typical Hodel-style plan and
its EIS are examined in light of the real impacts of grazing in a particular
place.
Judge Rampton's decision ended the shell game, at least with respect
to the Comb Wash Allotment. He held that, at the time a grazing permit is
issued or renewed, the BLM becomes accountable for its compliance with
NEPA with respect to that allotment.5 Like the holding nineteen years
previous in Morton, this holding does not imply that a separate NEPA
document is required for each permit."3 Nor does it prevent the BLMvl
from relying on a multi-level "tiered" process for NEPA compliance. I"4
147. Comb Wash 11, supra note 1, at 21-22; Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. 8, at 22, Comb
Wash H (testimony of Daryl Trotter). See also id. at 51, 53, 57 (referring to the "next step" and the
"next document").
148. Comb Wash II, supra note I, at 10; Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. 9, at 148, 153, Comb
Wash II; Deposition of Edward Scherick, BLM San Juan Resource Area Manager at 46, Comb Wash
//.
149. For a description of a similar shell game regarding the evaluation of the suitability of lands
for livestock grazing, see Joseph M. Feller, 'Til the Cows Come Home: The Fatal Flaw in the Clinton
Administration's Public Lands Grazing Policy, 25 ENVTL. L. 703, 708 (1995).
150. See supra text accompanying note 136.
151. See 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, § 10F.04[4][b] (characterizing the land use
plan approved in Hodel as a "non-plan" and "little more than a confused melange of do-nothing moth-
erhood statements which offered neither managers nor users much useful guidance on future manage-
ment").
152. Comb Wash II, supra note I, at 19 ("It is axiomatic that when an appellant challenges an
action on NEPA grounds, the reviewing tribunal must determine whether the agency's existing NEPA
documentation is adequate to support that action.").
153. See Morton, 388 F. Supp. at 841.
154. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28.
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But it does imply that, when it issues or renews the permit, the BLM may
be required to identify precisely where and when it has analyzed the site-
specific environmental consequences of that permit.
C. Grazing Without Thought
1. Confusion in the Ranks
While the BLM had difficulty identifying exactly where and when it
had analyzed the environmental consequences of livestock grazing on the
Comb Wash Allotment, it had even greater difficulty identifying when and
how it had made the decision to allow grazing in the sensitive canyons
that were the focus of the litigation. The responsible BLM official, the
Area Manager, testified that he exercised his discretion to authorize graz-
ing in the canyons on the advice of the range conservationist on his
staff' 5 The range conservationist, however, testified that he had acted
under the belief that the decision to allow grazing in the canyons had
already been made in the land use plan.'56 The Area Manager, who was
responsible for the development of the land use plan, believed that the
plan had left the issue undecided. 7
It would be easy to dismiss this episode of mutual finger-pointing as
a simple breakdown in communication or in lines of authority in one
particular BLM office. To do so, however, would be a serious mistake. A
similar inquiry in virtually any BLM office in the West would yield simi-
lar results. BLM employees are unable to identify exactly who makes
decisions to perpetuate grazing in particular areas for the simple reason
that no one consciously makes such decisions. Rather, almost everyone
involved operates under the unstated and unquestioned assumption that
grazing will continue unless and until someone makes a decision to stop
it.' Therefore, grazing takes place on virtually all of the lands managed
by the BLM without any official being required to explain why grazing is
justified in any particular place or to consider the possibility that it might
be discontinued. Since grazing proceeds by assumption rather than by con-
scious decision, inquiries into the decisionmaking process inevitably yield
confused and confusing answers.
155. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 8.
156. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 8.
157. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 8.
158. See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. 17, at 35-36, 44, Comb Wash II (testimony of
BLM range conservationist that he believed the canyons on the Comb Wash Allotment should be
grazed because the applicable land use plan did not say that they should not be).
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2. Avoiding the Question
BLM planning is structured in a way that usually precludes consider-
ation of the appropriateness of grazing in particular areas. In developing
land use plans, the BLM generally does not attempt to compare the harms
and benefits of grazing in specific places and does not consider alterna-
tives that attempt to discriminate between lands suitable and unsuitable for
grazing."9 Moreover, the EISs accompanying BLM land use plans gen-
erally lack the information that would be necessary to weigh the advantag-
es and disadvantages of grazing in specific locations. For example, the EIS
accompanying the San Juan Resource Management Plan, which included
the Comb Wash Allotment, did not reveal or discuss the nature or extent
of the extraordinary scenic, archaeological, and recreational resources in
the Comb Wash canyons, the small quantity of the livestock forage there,
the relative importance to the local economy of the various resources in
the canyons, or the damage being done by livestock grazing to the other
resources in the canyons." Without this type of site-specific informa-
tion, rational decisions about where grazing is appropriate and where it is
inappropriate are not possible. Therefore, the suitability of particular lands
for grazing is generally not discussed in BLM land use plans. Nonetheless,
the plans leave lands open for grazing and, once a land use plan is com-
pleted, the BLM will refuse to consider the possibility of terminating graz-
ing in any area covered by the plan on the grounds that the issue was
already decided in the plan. 6 ' Thus, like NEPA compliance, the issue of
the suitability of lands for grazing is lost in a shell game where it is never
really addressed. 62
159. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 571-72. See also
Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1054-55 (upholding a BLM decision not to consider a no-grazing alternative in
a land use plan).
160. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 24.
161. See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. 17, at 21-23, Comb Wash II; Phoenix District
Office, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of the Interior, Notice of Final Decision 3
(May 31, 1991) (declaring that "a decision not to graze these lands would be inconsistent with [the]
land use plan," despite the fact that the lands in question were not even under BLM administration at
the time the plan was promulgated).
162. For a description of a similar shell game on the National Forests, see Feller, supra note
149, at 708.
The implicit assumption that grazing should continue unquestioned is also manifested in other
ways. According to the BLM's Grazing Administration Handbook, for example, a BLM official must
go through formal decisionmaking procedures if and when she rejects an application for a grazing
permit, but not when she grants one. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTE-
RIOR, GRAZING ADMINISTRATION HANDBOOK § H-4160-1.1 (1984); but see supra part I.B of this
Article (describing Comb Wash I decision requiring such procedures when a grazing permit is issued).
And in environmental assessments of grazing management proposals, year-round grazing is implicitly
assumed to be the baseline to which all other alternatives are compared. Thus, grazing on a seasonal
or periodic basis is said to improve resource conditions, even if the resources would be better off with
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3. Hodel Again
The BLM's refusal to consider the suitability of lands for grazing was
seemingly affirmed in Hodel, in which the court held that the BLM was
not required to consider a no-grazing alternative when it developed its
land use plan for the Reno, Nevada planning area. 63 According to the
Hodel court, complete elimination of grazing on all public lands in the
area would be "practically unthinkable" because of the loss of jobs and
income that would result.'6
Hodel, however, discussed only the reasonableness of terminating
grazing on an entire planning area comprising 700,000 acres of public
land and encompassing fifty-five different grazing allotments. The plain-
tiffs in Hodel did not raise the issue of whether the BLM should be re-
quired to consider intermediate alternatives under which portions, but not
all, of the planning area would be closed to grazing.
4. The Comb Wash Case
As with the NEPA issue, the Comb Wash case stands for the proposi-
tion that Hodel only deferred, and did not eliminate, the BLM's responsi-
bility to address difficult questions concerning livestock grazing on the
public lands. Issues avoided by the BLM in its land use planning must be
addressed somewhere else in the management process. Specifically, Judge
Rampton held that, before authorizing grazing in the canyons on the Comb
Wash Allotment, the BLM must make a "reasoned and informed" deter-
mination of whether grazing in those canyons is in the public interest. 65
Moreover, he held that, in order to make such a reasoned and informed
decision, the BLM must address the type of site-specific questions about
the economic and environmental impacts of grazing that were not explored
in the development of the area-wide land use plan."
no grazing at all. See, e.g., ED CHANEY, Er AL., MANAGING CHANGE: LIVESTOCK GRAZING ON WEST-
ERN RIPARIAN AREAS 21 (1993) (stating that winter grazing is "beneficial" to riparian ecosystems
because it provides rest during the growing season); BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR LIvEsToCK USE AUTHORIZATION ON THE SANTA
MARIA RANCH ALLOTMENT 15 (1991) (stating that riparian vegetation would "benefit" from the pro-
posed initiation of livestock grazing because riparian areas would receive rest during spring and sum-
mer months).
163. Hodel, 624 F. Supp at 1054-55.
164. Id. at 1054.
165. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 23-25.
166. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 24.
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IV. GIVING MEANING TO "MULTIPLE-USE"
A. Multiple Use and Reasoned Decisionmaking
Judge Rampton's holding, that the BLM must rationally evaluate the
appropriateness of grazing in the Comb Wash canyons, was based on the
principle of "multiple use." That principle is defined in the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) as follows:
The term "multiple use" means the management of the public lands and
their various resource values so that they are utilized in the combination
that will best meet the present and future needs of the American people;
making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these re-
sources or related services over areas large enough to provide sufficient
latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing needs and
conditions; the use of some land for less than all of the resources; a
combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that takes into ac-
count the long-term needs of future generations for renewable and non-
renewable resources, including, but not limited to, recreation, range,
timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scien-
tific and historical values; and harmonious and coordinated management
of the various resources without permanent impairment of the productiv-
ity of the land and the quality of the environment with consideration
being given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily to
the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the
greatest unit output.67
Over the years, the concept of multiple use has been much maligned,
much misunderstood, and little litigated. Many BLM and Forest Service
employees who have never read the statutory definition believe that the
concept requires them to allow all feasible uses of a given piece of land,
or to maximize the number of uses. Some legal commentators have argued
that the statutory definition itself is nothing more than a collection of
"vacuous platitudes,"'68 too vague and discretionary to be judicially en-
forceable.'69 The paucity of litigation arising under the definition has
167. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). See also 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (requiring the BLM to manage public
lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield). A nearly identical definition of multiple
use is applied to the National Forests in the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 529,
531(a) (1994). For discussions of the history and meaning of multiple use, see 3 COGGINS &
GLICKSMAN, supra note 11, ch. 16; Coggins, supra note 122, at 15-16, 32-74; George C. Coggins, Of
Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning of "Multiple Use, Sustained Yield" for
Public Land Management, 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 229 (1982).
168. Christopher C. Curtis, Comment, Managing Federal Lands: Replacing the Multiple UWe
System, 82 YALE L.J. 787, 788 (1973).
169. See, e.g., Comment, supra not 168; Robert H. Strand, Statutory Authority Governing Man-
agement of the National Forest System-Time for a Change?, 7 NAT. RFS. L. 479, 489 (1974);
Charles A. Reich, The Public and the Nation's Forests, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 381, 386 (1962).
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tended to reinforce that view. 70
Professor George Coggins of the University of Kansas, however, has
cogently argued that the above-quoted definition, along with the statutory
definition of the related concept of "sustained yield,' ' ' holds more con-
tent than its critics have admitted:
[A] close reading of those [multiple use, sustained yield] statutes demon-
strates that they are not like Oakland; there is some there there. The
multiple use laws contain a series of "shalls" and "shall nots" that ought
to be binding on public land managers. They demand an equality of
resource treatment, and they forbid practices that detract from the future
productivity of the land. They demand thought and foresight, and they
prohibit economic optimization of single resources."T7
Professor Coggins concluded that, if the multiple use mandate were judi-
cially enforced, then "[iln defending their actions, the agencies would have
to confront their actual reasoning and bases for decision."'73 This author,
following Professor Coggins' lead, has argued that the multiple use princi-
ple requires the BLM to permit grazing only where grazing's economic,
social, and environmental benefits exceed its harms.'74
Professor Coggins' prediction came true in the Comb Wash case,
albeit in an administrative, quasi-judicial forum rather than in a court. In
defending its decision to authorize livestock grazing in the Comb Wash
canyons, the BLM had to confront the fact that the decision was based on
default rather than on deliberation. Judge Rampton found that this failure
of rationality violated the multiple use principle, which "'requires that the
values in question be informedly and rationally taken into balance' to
determine whether the proposed activity is in the public interest."'7" Un-
der the principle, the BLM must "weigh[] the benefits and harms" of
grazing in the canyons. 76
170. See Coggins, supra note 167, at 243-50.
171. See 16 U.S.C. § 531(b); 43 U.S.C. § 1702(h).
172. Coggins, supra note 167, at 279.
173. Coggins, supra note 167, at 280.
174. See Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 566; Feller,
supra note 149, at 706-07.
175. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 23 (quoting Sierra Club v. Butz, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,292, 20,293 (9th Cir. 1973)).
176. Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 23.
Judge Rampton also wrote that the BLM must make a reasoned and informed decision as to
whether "the benefits of grazing ... outweigh the costs." Comb Wash II, supra note 1, at 23. Focusing
on these words, some readers of the opinion have concluded that Judge Rampton was requiring the
BLM to perform a "cost-benefit analysis." See Statement of Reasons and Memorandum in Support
Filed by Utah Farm Bureau Federation, National Wildlife Federation v. BLM, No. IBLA 94-264 (Inte-
rior Board of Land Appeals, Statement filed May 19, 1994); GLIcKsMAN & COGGINS, supra note 14,
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B. Multiple Use and Livestock Numbers
Judge Rampton also found that the BLM had violated the principle of
multiple use in its determination of the number of livestock that it would
permit to graze on the Comb Wash Allotment, both inside and outside of
the canyons that were the focus of the case.1" Following the policy es-
tablished during the administration of President Ronald Reagan and Interi-
or Secretary James Watt, 7 ' the BLM had based the authorized number
of livestock exclusively on measurements of forage "utilization," which
indicates how severely individual plants are being grazed, and of range-
land "trend," which reflects changes in the numbers and types of
plants.'79 This author has argued that these indicators, which are related
primarily to the condition of the livestock forage resource, fail to take into
account the often severe impacts of grazing on other public land resources
such as soils, water quality, wildlife habitat, archaeological resources, and
natural scenery. 8 Judge Rampton reached a similar conclusion, holding
that the BLM's refusal to consider information other than utilization and
trend data "violate[d] FLPMA's mandate to manage the public lands to
protect the full spectrum of environmental, ecological, cultural, and recre-
ational values."' 8'
Judge Rampton's decision should serve as a caution for land manag-
ers to avoid the common mistake of assuming that livestock numbers are
acceptable whenever they are within the "grazing capacity" or the "carry-
ing capacity"'82 of the land." 3 Grazing capacity, as usually determined
through measurements of forage production and utilization, is the number
of livestock that an area could sustainably support if it were to be man-
aged for livestock production and nothing else. On lands managed for
multiple use, grazing capacity should be considered an outside, upper limit
on livestock numbers, not a desirable level or a goal. Grazing by a number
of livestock equal to, or even below, an area's measured grazing capacity
can, and often does, seriously degrade other resources and seriously affect
at 220. Taken in context, however, these words clearly were intended to require a weighing and bal-
ancing of factors, not necessarily a quantitative cost-benefit analysis. Before making this statement,
Judge Rampton discussed numerous non-monetary factors that the BLM must consider. See Comb
Wash II, supra note 1, at 11-16 (discussing the impacts of grazing on riparian areas, wildlife habitat,
archaeological resources, recreation, and aesthetic values). His opinion required the BLM to weigh
these impacts against the benefits of grazing, but not necessarily to measure them in dollars and cents.
177. Comb Wash 1I, supra note 1, at 25.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
179. See Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note I, at 578.
180. See Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 561-63, 576.
181. Comb Wash I1, supra note 1, at 25 (citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(8), 1702(c)).
182. See 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1995) (defining livestock carrying capacity).
183. Even Professor Coggins has made this mistake. See 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note
11, § 19.0511.
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other land uses that are not taken into account in the measurements used
to determine capacity. 8 The need to provide forage for wildlife, to re-
store or enhance wildlife habitat, to protect archaeological resources, to
maintain water quality, to preserve natural scenery, or to reduce conflicts
between livestock and recreational use may require levels of livestock use
substantially below grazing capacity.
185
The relationship between levels of livestock use and land manage-
ment goals is illustrated in the following table:
Land Abuse Cattle Ranch Multiple Use Preservation
Management Management
Grazing occurs Grazing occurs Grazing occurs in No grazing.
wherever feasible. wherever sustainable, selected areas.
Livestock numbers Livestock numbers Livestock numbers
allowed to exceed set equal to grazing held below grazing
grazing capacity. capacity. capacity to
accommodate other
uses and resources.
Faithful implementation of the multiple use concept requires abandon-
ment of the Reagan era policy of basing authorized livestock numbers
exclusively on range utilization and trend data."6 It also requires an end
to the stalling tactic of endlessly perpetuating historic livestock numbers
while awaiting the collection of more and better data.'87 Many of the im-
pacts of livestock grazing-visual degradation, trampling of vegetation and
stream banks, deposition of manure in campsites and water sources, and
denudation of the landscape' 88-are readily apparent and do not require
extensive data-gathering to document. Judge Rampton's decision affirms
184. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 561-62.
185. See, e.g., FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
FOR DIAMOND BAR ALLOTMENT MANAGEMENT PLAN 10-13 (1995) (describing ten alternatives for
management of a grazing allotment, with livestock numbers ranging from zero to 1188 cattle).
A recent unpublished district court decision confirms that NEPA requires land management
agencies to consider alternative scenarios with fewer livestock than an area's grazing capacity.
Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 31, Seidman v. Gunzel, No. CIV 94-2266 PHX-RGS (D. Ariz.,
Jan. 16, 1996) (oral decision requiring the Forest Service to "consider[] the full range of alternatives,
that is not only from zero to status quo, and/or the number determined in the production/utilization
survey, but all other numbers in between coupled with a consideration of all of the competing values
that are involved in any government lands' use, including all of the recreational and wildlife concerns
as well as the grazing concerns").
186. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
187. See supra text accompanying note 127.
188. See Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note I, at 590.
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that these types of impacts are lawful grounds for reductions in livestock
numbers.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in the Comb Wash case was a vindication of the princi-
ple of multiple use and an indictment of the BLM's range management
policies and practices. The case gave meaning to multiple use by revealing
a pattern of management that is so irrational and so oblivious to values
other than livestock production that it cannot be reconciled with even such
a broad and vague concept. This pattern is not an aberration; it reflects
BLM policies and practices in effect throughout the West."9 It simply
stood out in bolder relief in the Comb Wash canyons than in some other
places because of the gross imbalance there between enormous scenic,
ecological, and archaeological resources and a paltry amount of livestock
forage."
It remains to be seen, however, whether the case will have a signifi-
cant effect on BLM practices outside of the Comb Wash Allotment. As
noted at the outset of this Article, the decision was rendered by a low-
level administrative tribunal. Even if, as is likely, the decision is affirmed
by the Interior Board of Land Appeals,'91 it may not be broadly heeded.
Precedents are not self-enforcing, especially in public land management,
where traditions and habits are deeply entrenched, and where decentralized
decisionmaking may be influenced more by local social and economic
pressures than by legal rules. 92 On the majority of allotments, the Comb
Wash decision may have little or no effect unless-and maybe even
if-the national BLM administration undertakes to incorporate the lessons
189. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 586.
190. Feller, What is Wrong With the BLM's Management?, supra note 1, at 587-89.
191. See supra note 5. Affirmance by the IBLA seems likely for two reasons. First, the BLM's
appeal of Judge Rampton's decision leaves most of the decision, including the order prohibiting graz-
ing in the canyons pending compliance with NEPA, unchallenged. See Bureau of Land Management
Statement of Reasons for Appeal and Request for Modification of Decision, National Wildlife Fed'n v.
BLM, No. IBLA 94-264 (filed May 20, 1994). The BLM's appeal takes issue only with Judge
Rampton's description of the analysis required by FLPMA's definition of multiple use. See id. The
intervenors in the case have filed more extensive appeals. See Statement of Reasons/Opening Brief of
the Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribe, and Statement of Reasons and Memorandum in Support Filed by
Utah Farm Bureau Federation, National Wildlife Federation v. BLM, No. IBLA 94-264 (filed March
30, 1994, and May 19, 1994). However, these appellants are now in the awkward posture of defending
BLM positions that the BLM is no longer defending.
Second, the IBLA may have given some indication of its leaning on the merits when it exer-
cised its discretion to overturn an automatic stay, 43 C.F.R. § 4.477(a) (1995), and place Judge
Rampton's decision into full force and effect pending the IBLA's resolution of the appeal. See supra
note 5.
192. See, e.g., PHILIP 0. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1960).
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of the decision into its regulations or into other guidance that it offers to
local BLM offices.
To date, the two primary holdings of the Comb Wash case-the
requirement for site-specific environmental analysis under NEPA and the
mandate to weigh the pros and cons of grazing in particular areas-have
not been reflected in any change in BLM regulations or guidance. Al-
though the national administration has recently promulgated "Rangeland
Reform '94, '"93 a broad re-writing of the grazing regulations, Rangeland
Reform '94 has not altered the BLM's NEPA process for grazing. In most
instances, the BLM still does not evaluate or consider the site-specific
impacts of grazing either in land use plans or when permits are renewed.
Nor does Rangeland Reform '94 include any direction or process for ques-
tioning the appropriateness of grazing in economically marginal or envi-
ronmentally sensitive areas.
19 4
In the (likely) absence of further initiatives from the administration,
the Comb Wash decision will be significant primarily as a tool in the
hands of dedicated individuals who are willing to spend the time and
energy to press local BLM officials to follow it in their administration of
individual grazing allotments. Opportunities for such public involvement at
the allotment level have long been required by BLM regulations, 95
though only in recent years have those aspects of the regulations been
exercised. The new regulations established by Rangeland Reform '94 pre-
serve and clarify these opportunities, though they don't significantly ex-
pand them.'
The ranks of citizen activists who have the time and commitment to
immerse themselves in the details of grazing management at the allotment
level are growing,"9 but they are still small compared to the thousands
of BLM grazing allotments across the West.9 On allotments where the
193. See 60 Fed. Reg. 9894 (1995). Rangeland Reform '94 is described and criticized in Feller,
supra note 149, passim.
194. See Feller, supra note 149, at 712-14.
195. See Feller, Grazing Management on the Public Lands, supra note 1, at 578-82, 591-93.
196. For example, the regulations promulgated by Rangeland Reform '94 provide opportunities
for participation by the "interested public," which is inclusively defined. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 9961
(definition of "interested public"). However, the previous regulations already required similar opportu-
nities for participation by "affected interests," see 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (1994), which had been inter-
preted to include conservationists and recreationists, see Donald K. Majors, 123 IBLA 142 (1992);
Feller, Grazing Management on the Public Lands, supra note 1, at 581 & n.76. The new regulations
explicitly provide for consultation with the interested public when the BLM issues or renews a grazing
permit, see 60 Fed. Reg. at 9966 (new 43 C.F.R. § 4130.2(b)), but the previous regulations had al-
ready been interpreted to require the same thing. See Feller, Grazing Management on the Public
Lands, supra note 1, at 573, 589.
197. CoGGINs, Er Al., supra note 116, at 768.
198. See Feller, Grazing Management on the Public Lands, supra note 1, at 573 n.18, 591 n.152
and accompanying text.
1996]
54 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW
only voices heard by the BLM are those of the permittees, significant
change should not be expected.199 There is one place, however, where
the Comb Wash decision has already had an effect. On the Comb Wash
Allotment, five magnificent red-rock canyons, with over fifty miles of
stream riparian habitat, have begun the process of recovery from decades
of devastation by inappropriate and ill-considered livestock grazing. They
are doing well.
199. Feller, Grazing Management on the Public Lands, supra note 1, at 593-94.
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